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An Analysis of the Effects of
Dolan v. City of Tigard
on One of California's Largest
Natural Resource Protectors
by Corey E. Taylor
I. INTRODUCTION
Fifth Amendment takings law has undergone many
changes in recent years. Specifically, several recent Supreme
Court cases have altered the traditional "balance' between a
compensable taking and an uncompensable use of the gov-
emment's police power. Before examining the impacts of
these recent changes, this Note will review the traditional
Fifth Amendment takings analysis and the additions to the
rubric that have taken place in recent years, specifically in
the area of land use exactions. The primary focus of this
Note will be on Dolan v. City of Tigard.' which was decided by
the United States Supreme Court during the 1994 term. After
examining the Dolan decision, this Note will hypothesize
Dolan's effects on natural resource protection by applying
the case's holdings to the regulations governing the
California Coastal Commission (hereinafter "Commission").
I. TAKINGS ANALYSIS
A. The Fifth Amendment
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution
is one of the most frequently invoked Constitutional protec-
tions. It is commonly cited when dealing with "incorpora-
tion" of the Bill of Rights2 or in the criminal arena when dis-
cussing double jeopardy or self-incrimination. 3 In land use
law, however, only the last clause of the Fifth Amendment.
the "takings" clause, applies: "nor shall private property be
taken for public use. without just compensation."4 This pro-
vision is applied to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment.5 Many, if not most, takings controversies
involve constitutional limitations on the power of local gov-
ernments and municipalities to regulate land uses.
6
Private land is often requisitioned 7 for public use by
state and local governments without triggering the Fifth
Amendment takings prohibition. Such use is allowed under
the guise of the government's police power, which.-general-
Class of 1995. University of California. Hastings Coilee of the Law; BA
with Honors. University of California at hInne. 199Z 7hanks to Guillermo
Slhnleln. loani Freitas. and the entire %1=1 staff.
I. Dolan v. City of Tigard.- US. _ 1 14 S Ct 2309 (1994),
2. Or reverse Incorporation." when the Fifth Amendment is invoLd to
apply the equal protection component of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
federal government Sr. eg,. Eolling v, Sh.rpe. 347 U.S 497 (1954).
3. See. eg.. Brown v. Walker. 161 U.S 591 (1895)
4. U.S. Cosr, amend..V.
5. U.S Co. amend. XIV Chicago B. &OR Co v, Chicago, 166 U.S. 226
(1897).
6. This holds true in the area of permit and subdivision exactions money
andfor land 'donated' to a govemment in exchange for the right to dTvelop
land. In some situations, state governments, rather than local governments.
have enacted regional ovedayzones. The Commisston is an exampleofa state-
wide organization that imp ses different or additional duties on land owners
than local ov;ernments through an overlayzonet Sezg.merafUy CAL Pua. Rm. CoG.a
§ 30000 (West 1994).
7. Whenever the use of the word "taken would be confusing and mis-
leading, other uords will be substituted throughout this Nlote
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ly speaking, allows governments to legislate for "the
health, safety, and morals of the public."8
Traditional zoning regulations. have been justified
by invoking this power.9 Wetland preservation,' 0
flood plain regulation,ii and landmark preserva-
tion 12 are other valid exercises of the government's
police power that are generally not considered tak-
ings under the Fifth Amendment. Thus, overburden-
some land regulation is considered a taking, but a
proper exercise of the government's police power
generally is not. As stated by Justice Holmes, "Itihe
general rule is that while property may be regulated
to a certain extent, if regulation goe' too far it will
be recognized as a taking." 3
By placing the government's police power and
a compensable taking on a continuum, Justice
Holmes established the framework for over seventy
years of case law, regulation, and litigation. An
obvious question follows from his statement: when
does a valid exercise of the government's police
power become so overburdensome that it trans-
forms into a taking? The line has shifted over time,
lending credence to Justice Clark's thirty-year-old
observation: "Itlhere is no set formula to determine
where regulation ends and taking begins."14 In the
past ten years, the Supreme Court still has not set a
formula, but it has laid out certain elements essen-
tial to takings cases.
8. Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
9. See, e.g.. Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 375 (1926).
Zoning had its origins in the prevention of nuisances by determin-
ing in advance where certain land uses should take place. In 1922.
the U.S. Department of Commerce developed the Standard Zoning
Enabling Act, a model which was later implemented by several
states. In Euclid. the Supreme Court for the first time held that zon-
ing was Constitutional. Six years later, the Court limited its position
by holding that zoning which was applied arbitrarily or capriciously
or for a confiscatory purpose violated Constitutional prohibitions.
Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
10. See, e.g.. Morris County Land Improvement Co. v.
Parsippany-Troy Hills Township. 193 A.2d 232 (N.J. 1963).
11. See, e.g.. April v. City of Broken Arrow, 775 P.2d 1347 (Okla.
1989).
12. See. e.g., Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 J.S.
104 (1978).
13. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415
(1922).
14. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead. N.Y.. 369 U.S. 590, 594
(1962).
15. Penn. Central Transp. Co. v. New York City. 438 U.S. at 123.
California's Constitution mirrors the U.S. Constitution's require-
ment that just compensation be paid for a taking of private proper-
ty. CAL. CoNsr. art. 1. § 14.
16. The Supreme Court examined this issue in Berman v.
Parker. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
17. If the entire parcel is taken, fair market value as of the time
B. Traditional Takings Analysis
Not all government intrusions on private land
are alike. Generally, courts have defined two types
of Fifth Amendment takings: takings due to physical
occupation and regulatory takings.
Read literally, the Fifth Amendment only
applies to physical occupations of private land; the
government cannot occupy private land without
paying lust compensation. 15 Constitutional analysis
of this type of land use control by the government is
usually relatively straightforward and is conducted
in an eminent domain proceeding. There are two
limits placed on the government's taking of private
property: (1) the land must be taken for a valid pub-
lic use; 16 and (2) the Constitutional requirement of
"just compensation" must be satisfied.
17
Traditionally, regulatory takings have com-
prised the less concrete area of takings law. These
are takings that occur without actual physical occu-
pation of a private party's land, 8 Prior to recent
Supreme Court cases, several clear factors were
used by courts to evaluate whether a regulatory tak-
ing had occurred.19 In Penn Central Transportation Co. v.
New York City,20 the Court summarized a traditional
two-part test for a government entity to avoid pay-
ing compensation.
First, the challenged regulation must promote
a valid police power objective, i.e., it must promote
health, safety, morals, or general welfare. 21 In Penn
of the action is used. When only a portion of a parcel Is taken, val-
uation is more difficult. Section 1002 of the Uniform Eminent
Domain Code provides one method for determining what compen-
sation is iust: compensation is the greater of the value of the prop-
erty taken or the difference between the fair market value before
and after the taking. Most states award the value of the taken por-
tion plus damages to the portion not taken less any special bene-
fits missing from the taken land. ROBERT R. WRIGHT, LAND USE IN A
NUTSHELL 149-50 (3d ed. 1994). California's provisions for providing
lust compensation can be found at CAL. Cw. PROC. CODE § 1230.010
(West 1994).
18. This is the situation Justice Holmes referred to In
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415. In The Taking Issue,
the authors briefly discuss how English and United States colonial
practices led to the evolution of this continuum concept. FRED
BOSSELMAN Er AL.. THE TAKING IssuE 318-22 (1973).
19. For simplicity's sake, the term "taking will be used to refer
to regulatory takings as well as physical occupations throughout
the remainder of this Note.
20. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). Penn Central was a challenge of New
York City's Landmarks Preservation Law, NY.C. ADMIN. CODE ch. 8-A
§ 205-1.0. The statute designated Grand Central Terminal as a his-
toncal landmark which prevented the plaintiff land owner from lev-
eling the Terminal and building a high-rise on the property. The
Court found that no taking had occurred because the plaintiff could
continue to profitably use the terminal. Additionally, plaintiffs were
given Transfer of Development Rights (hereinafter 'TDRs') under
the Law, which allowed them to develop in another area where they
would have otherwise been precluded from so doing. Id. at 108-
115.
21. Id. at 125.
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Central, the plaintiffs did not contest that the -objec-
tive of preserving structures and areas with special
historic, architectural, or cultural significance is an
entirely permissible governmental goal."
22
Second, "the economic impact of the regula-
tion on the claimant, and, particularly, the extent to
which the regulation has interfered with distinct
investment backed expectations are of course rele-
vant considerations."2 3 In Pennsylvania Coal, Justice
Holmes, writing for the Court, struck down a statu-
tory prohibition against mining under occupied
buildings because upholding the statute would
have resulted in a substantial "diminution in value"
to the land.
2 4
Over sixty years after Pennsylvania Coal, the
Court formulated a different test to determine the
economic impact of the regulation: 2' the "reason-
able economic use" test.26 Under this test, land
owners did not have the right to the most beneficial
use of the land. Rather, they had the right to rea-
sonable use of the property.2 7 Of course, debate
ensued over what constituted a "reasonable use" of
property after regulation.
28
Finally. courts could examine "the character of
the governmental action. A 'taking' was more readi-
ly found when the interference with property could
be characterized as a physical invasion by the gov-
emment."29 One example of such a physical inva-
sion occured when the government granted public
access to a portion of pnvate land.30 Determining
22. Id at 129.
23. Id. at 124.
24. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 413-16.
25. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n. v. DeBenedictis. 480
U.S. 470 (1987). The Court upheld the state subsidence restrictions
in Keystone. because the statute at issue required that 50% of the
coal remain in the ground. This requirement 'protected the public
interest in health, the environment, and the fiscal Integrity of
the area." Id. at 488. Thus, the statute was attempting to abate a
common nuisance and constituted a valid exercise of the police
power.
26. Id. at 485.
27. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead. N.Y.. 369 U.S. at 592.
28. This is often an issue in flood plain, wetland, and agricul-
tural zoning. See. e.g.. Mors County Land Improvement Co. v.
Parsippany-Troy Hills Township, 193 A.2d 232 (N.J. 1963). It Is par-
ticularly troublesome to courts when a regulation seeks to preserve
open space. See. e.g.. Ross v. City of Rolling Hills Estates. 192 Cal,
App. 3d 370 (1987).
29. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City. 438 US. at
124.
30. When the federal government attempted to grant public
access to a private Hawaiian pond that had been converted Into a
bay. the Supreme Court found that a taking had occurred. Kaiser-
Aetna v. United States. 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
31. See. e.g.. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,
458 U.S. 419 (1982); Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483
whether a government regulation constituted a
physical invasion became an important and much-
debated issue during recent Supreme Court terms
and helped shape some of the modem trends in
takings law, as discussed below.
3
Lower courts, guided by the more traditional
Supreme Court decisions, worked within a frame-
work for determining when a regulatory taking had
occurred. In 1987 however, the methods the courts
used to examine land use regulations changed. 2
C. Modem Shifts
During the early- to mid-1980s, the Supreme
Court decided a trio of cases33 that established pre-
requisites for a land owner's initiating inverse con-
demnation actions 34 against a government entity.
Before such an action can proceed, the land owner
must file a development plan application with the
appropriate governmental agency and exhaust all
Administrative remedies available to them.35
Scholars have noted that these cases failed to
resolve the issue of whether compensation was an
appropriate remedy in regulatory takings cases26
In Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedfctis,3
the Supreme Court rejected the idea of conceptual
severance:38 "liln deciding whether a particular gov-
ernmental action has effected a taking, this Court
focuses both on the character of the action and on
the nature of the interference with rights in the parcel
as a vhole." The Court also reaffirmed the nuisance
US. 825 (1937); Yee v. City of Escondito, 503 U.S. 519 (1992); Dolan
v. City of Tigard. 114 S. CL 2309 (1994).
32. A,.i scm P:a Asscmro.4 FL wimiuu A. ,o Szmr..
Rso.-mcnGo TH iE Tpxunos QwHA~moz. A Gu=oz rc~t 0,ra.ms mmO
Pu.is. REuci No. 416 (1989) (herelnafter'PRere. No. 416").
33. Agins v, City of Tiburon. 447 U.S. 255 (19390); San Diego
Gas and Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego. 450 U.S. 621 (1931);
MacDonald. Sommer and Frates v, County of Yolo (Californmia). 477
US, 340 (1936).
a 34. An inverse condemnation action, as the name suggests, is
an action brought by a private citizen against a go.-emment. assert-
ing that the gm-emments actions have resulted in a taking of the
Individuals property for which lust compensation is due.
35. Thus. land owners must request a variance, conditional
use permit, or otherwise avll themselves of any exclusions from
the local or regional gCo remmens General plan. Practitioners know
from experience that the tediousness of lumping through so many
administrative hurdles will cause them to "mitigate. not litigate."
RPcrr No. 416, supra note 32.at 5.
36, Id.
37.480 US. 470(1937),
38. Conceptual se;erance is a theory which h3lds that when
examining the impact of a regulation on land. administratkve agen-
des and courts should consider the effect of the regulation on a
particular portion of the property.
39. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S.
at 497.
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exception to regulatory takings analysis. 40 Scholars
have posited that this case left the relationship of
the nuisance exception to traditional takings analy-
sis uncertain, but did little to change traditional
takings law.4' That change began in earnest with
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los
Angeles.
42
First English involved a twenty-one acre parcel of
land, purchased in 1957, situated along Mill Creek,
in the Angeles National Forest. Twelve acres of the
plot were used by the church as a campground until
1978, when a flood overran the banks of the creek
and wiped out the site. When a fire destroyed much
of the upstream forest the previous year, the area
had become a flood hazard. In 1979, Los Angeles
County enacted an interim flood ordinance that,
among other things, precluded the plaintiff from
rebuilding where the campsite had once stood.
43
First English Church brought suit alleging a Fifth
Amendment taking. After the California Court of
Appeal invalidated the ordinance, the U.S.Supreme
Court granted certiorari.
44
The Supreme Court assumed that the Los
Angeles interim ordinance amounted to a regulato-
ry taking of the plaintiff's property: "the Los Angeles
Ordinances have deprived appellant of all reason-
able use of its property for a considerable period of
years .... ,45 The Court then determined that invali-
dation of the ordinance was an insufficient remedy
and held that land owners were entitled to receive
money damages as compensation for temporary
takings. 46 First English also affirmed the two-part test
set out irr Agmns to determine whether a land use
regulation was unconstitutional.
47
40. See supra note 25.
41. Frank Michelman. Takings, 1987, 88 COLUM. L. Rev. 1600.
1603 n.19 (1988).
42. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
43. Id. at 307.
44. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los
Angeles, 479 U.S. 807 (1986).
45. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los
Angeles. 482 U.S. at 322.
46, Id. at 319. Temporary takings were defined by the maiority
as 'regulatory takings which are ultimately invalidated by courts" Id.
at 310. The three dissenting Justices argued that the preservation
of life and property was at the heart of the police power, and thus
floodplain regulations of this type could never amount to a
taking. Id. at 326-28 (Stevens, j.. dissenting). Justice Stevens further
noted that temporary takings can be seen as conceptual
severance on a temporal scale. Id. at 328-35 (Stevens. I., dissent-
ing).
47. Id. at 336 (Stevens. I.. dissenting). This test was summa-
rized by the Court: "A land use regulation does not effect a taking if
it 'substantially advances legitimate state interests' and does not
'deny an owner economically viable use of his land.'" Dolan v. City
of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. at 2316 (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon. 447
On remand, the California Court of Appeal
summarized the scope of the Supreme Court's deci-
sion: "Itlhe United States Supreme Court in First
English made it abundantly clear the Court was
deciding the remedies issue - and only that issue.
The majority specifically held it was not deciding
appellant had stated a cause of action."48 The
California Court of Appeal decided that First
English Church had not stated a cause of action for
two reasons. First, the ordinance fit the "public safe-
ty exception" to the takings rule, because it sought
to prevent death and injury.49 Second, the Church
was not deprived of all uses of its property, because
it could still build "accessory buildings" within the
affected area.' 0
In 1992, the Supreme Court decided Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council.Yi Lucas was a land
developer who had purchased lots along South
Carolina's coast to build single family homes.' 2 In
1988, the State Legislature had enacted the
Beachfront Management Act, 53 which rendered
Lucas' land "valueless" by not letting him build until
a 1990 amendment to the statute allowed Lucas to
apply for a building permit.54 Lucas sued, seeking
damages for the temporary regulatory taking he suf-
fered from 1988 until 1990. Justice Scalia, writing for
the Court, stated "when the owner of real property
has been called upon to sacrifice all economically
beneficial uses in the name of the common
good.. .he has suffered a taking." 5 However, even in
those situations, a land owner will not be compen-
sated for uses that were not inherent in his title,
because those will be considered nuisances.5 6
California courts have limited the holdings of
U.S. at 260).
48. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los
Angeles, 210 Cal. App. 3d 1353, 1359-60 (1990). cert denied, 493 U S
1056 (1990).
49. The court stated.'Itlhe interim ordinance In question sub-
stantially advanced the preeminent state Interest In public safety
and did not deny appellant all use of its property.' First English
Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles. 210 Cal
App. 3d at 1367.
50. "Accessory uses" include "swimming pools landl parking
lots." Id. at 1371. "What First English can no longer do Is rebuild the
bunkhouses and similar permanent living structures which might
house the potential victims of a future flood,,," Id,
51. - U.S... 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992)
52. Id. at 2889.
53. S.C. CODE § 48-39-250 (West Supp, 1990),
54. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct at
2889-90.
55. Id. at 2895.
56. Id. at 2900. An excellent review of the Lucas decision Is Jill
Dickey Protos. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, A Tremor on
the Regulatory Takings Richter Scale, 43 CASE W. Res L, REv. 651 (1993)
C0rev E. T 0r Volum 2, Nw& 3
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First English and Lucas considerably such that a prop-
erty owner who retains the right to exclude others
and the right to sell property is not denied all use of
the property.57 When looking at the effect of a regu-
lation on a land owner's property, "the focus of the
inquiry is on the uses of the property which
remain."' 8 Thus, government regulations are much
less likely to be considered regulatory takings in
California than in many other jurisdictions.
III. NOLLAN: BEGGING THE DOLAN QUESTION
For the purpose of analyzing Dolan's possible
effects on the Commission, the most important
Supreme Court case is Nollan v. California Coastal
Con iSn i .5 9
A. The Road to the Supreme Court
Mr. and Mrs. Nollan were lessors of a small
beachfront lot in Ventura County, California. Their
option to purchase the lot was conditioned upon
demolishing an existing 504 square foot bungalow
and replacing it with a larger house. Before building
the new structure, the Nollans sought a building
permit from the appropriate authorities. 60 The
Commission granted the permit, but conditioned
the approval on the Nollans' recording an easement
across their property.61 The Nollans challenged the
Commission's easement requirement as a violation
of their Constitutional rights prohibiting the taking
of private property.
The Ventura County Superior Court, respond-
ing-to the Nollans' writ of administrative man-
damus, remanded the case to the Commission,
which held a full public hearing, pursuant to its reg-
ulations, and reaffirmed its pnor decision. The
Commission found that building the new, larger
57. See. eg.. Guinnane v. City and County of San Francisco. 197
Cal. App. 3d 862, 868 (1988).
58. Id.
59. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
60. Section 30600(a) of the California Public Resources code
states- 'in addition to obtaining any other permit required by law
from any local government or from any state, regional, or local
agency, on or-after January 1. 1977. any person wishing to perform
or undertake any development in the coastal zone...shall obtain a
coastal development permit." CA. PUB. RES. CODE § 30600(a) (West
1994). The coastal zone includes, generally, any land within 1.000
yards of the mean high tide line of the Pacific Ocean. CAL. PUB. RES.
CODE § 30103(a) (West 1994).
61. Nollan v. Califormia Coastal Commission. 483 U.S. at 828.
The easement was to run parallel to the Pacific ocean. 'bounded by
the mean high tide line on one side. and their seawall on the other
side." Id.
62. Id.
63. The Commission conditioned forty.three of sixty plots in
structure on the property would contribute to "the
development of a wall of residential structures that
would prevent the public psychologically from real-
izing a stretch of [public] coastline exists near-
by.,..'62 Further, the Commission argued that it had
already conditioned the permits of all other similar-
ly situated land owners in the area.63 The Nollans
appealed the Commission's administrative find-
ings, and the Superior Court ruled that enlarging
the structure did not create a burden on public
access to the sea sufficient to justify an uncom-
pensable taking.&4
The Commission appealed, and the California
Court of Appeal reversed on two grounds. First, the
court held that § 30212 of the California Coastal Act
required a permit from the Commission whenever a
new house "whose floor area, height or bulk was
more than 10% larger than that of the house it was
replacing be conditioned on a grant of access."65
The Superior Court had found that a grant of access
was necessary only "when the proposed develop-
ment would have an adverse impact on public
access to the sea."46 Second, relying on Grupe v.
California Coastal Coinisson,67 the court held that an
indirect relationship between the exaction and the
overall effect on access that the project contributed
to was sufficient for the conditioned permit to be
deemed Constitutional.03 The Supreme Court grant-
ed certiorari to decide the Constitutionality of the
permit's condition.
B. The Supreme Court's Decision
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, held that
conditioning a permit upon the granting of an ease-
ment to the public could not be considered a
Constitutional taking.P9 The Court found the ease-
ment to be a "permanent physical occupation"70 by
the public. This finding was based, in part, on the
the tract Fourteen more permits were issued before the
Commission could condition permits, and three others had no
shorefront land IL at 829
64CU
65. C. PtaM Rs Coo- § 30212 (West 19;0)-
66. Nollan v. Califomla Coastal Commission. 483 U.S. at 829.
67 166 Cal. App 3d 148 (1936) (if a project -contributed tothe
need for publicaccess,. .e;en if there was onlyan indirect relation-
ship between the access exacted and the need to which the proect
contributed. imposition of an access condition on a development
permit was sufficiently related to burdens created by the project to
be Constitutional°)
63. Nollan v Califomia Coastal Commission. 433 U.S. at 830.
69. U at 841-4Z
70 Id. (quoting Loretto v, Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp.. 458 US. 419,432-33 n9 (1932)) The basis of this concept is
the right to exclude others as "one of the most essential sticks in
the bundle of rights that are commonly chara:tenzed as property."
Kaiser-Aetna v. U S. 444 US, 164. 176 (1979).
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majority's feeling that the Court's cases "uniformly
have found a taking to the extent of the occupation,
without regard to whether the action achieves an
important public benefit or has only minimal eco-
nomic impact on the owner."
71
The Court restated the standards used to deter-
mine whether or not a regulation amounted to a
taking: "Iwle have long recognized that land use reg-
ulation does not effect a taking if it substantially
advances legitimate state interests and does not
deny an owner economically viable use of his
land."72 Justice Scalia went on to state that the
Court had not decided what type of connection
between the regulation and the interest would be
necessary to "substantially advance" the state inter-
est.73 The Court assumed that the Commission's
reasoning in conditioning the permit fit the consti-
tutional "test",7 4 and that, therefore, the
Commission could have denied the Nollans' permit
"unless the denial would interfere so drastically
with the Nollans' use of their property as to consti-
tute a taking."
75
Justice Scalia reasoned that if the Commission
could deny a permit under the state's police power,
then it could condition one.7 6
The evident constitutional propriety disap-
pears, however, if the condition substitut-
ed for the prohibition utterly fails to further
the end advanced as the justification for
the prohibition. When that essential nexus
is eliminated, the situation becomes the
same as if California law forbade shouting
fire in a crowded theater but granted dis-
pensations to those willing to contribute
SI 00 to the state treasury.
77
Justice Scalia then concluded: "Iiln short,
unless the permit condition serves the same gov-
ernmental purpose as the development ban, the
building restriction is not a valid regulation of land
use, but 'an out-and-out plan of extortion."'78
The Court held that the easement granted to
the public to mitigate interference with visual
access to the beach "does not even meet the most
untailored standards."79 Further, the Court stated
that California was the only United States jurisdic-
tion that did not treat exactions of this type as com-
pensable takings.80
Thus, despite the majority's statement to the
contrary, it appears that the Court did not truly
adopt the Commission's reasoning as to how to fur-
ther the goal of providing public access to the
beach. Rather, the Court held, in effect, that to "sub-
stantially advance" a legitimate state interest, there
must be an "essential nexus" between that interest
and the condition imposed. Thus, it seems that the
standard used in Nollan could be rewritten as: "a
valid exercise of the police power must substantial-
ly advance the nght state interest." Justice Scalia
conceded that the Commission's belief that "a con-
tinuous strip of publicly accessible beach along the
coast...may well be ...a good idea. ..but if Ithe
Commission] wants an easement across the
Nollans' property, it must pay for it.81
IV. DOLAN V. CITY OF TIGARD
For the next several years, state courts attempt-
ed to discern the impact of Nollan. In Oregon, this
uncertainty was manifested in Dolan v. City of Tigard.
A. The Controversy
Mr. and Mrs. Dolan owned a 1.67-acre plot of
land in downtown Tigard, Oregon.8 2 The land, which
was the site of a 9,700 square foot electric and
plumbing supply store,83 bordered Fanno Creek,
which was known to flood periodically. 84 The plot
was within the city's central business district and
was subject to an "action area" overlay zone.8' This
zone implemented "the policies of the Tigard
71. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CA'rV Corp., 458 U.S.
at 434-35. This line of thinking was criticized by Justice Stevens in
his dissent in Dolan. See infra text accompanying notes 145-148.
Justice Scalia seemed to contradict himself later in the opinion
when he mentioned that the Commission could have allowed a
public viewing spot on the Nollan's land. See infra text accompany-
Ing note 229.
72. Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. at 834
(quoting Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)). Arguably. this
standard is the same as that used when reviewing equal protection
claims of illegitimate children. See, e.g.. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202
(1982).
73. Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. at 835.
74. The reasons included "protecting the public's ability to see
the beach, assisting the public in overcoming the psychological
barrier to using the beach created by a developed shorefront, and
preventing congestion on thepublic beaches," Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 836.
77. Id.
78. Id. (quoting I.E.D. Associates, Inc. v, Atkinson, 432 A.2d 12,
14-i5 (N.H. 1981)).
79. Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. at 838,
80. Id.
81. Id. at 841-42.
82. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 854 P.2d 437. 438 (Or, 1993).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 439.
85. Id. at 438.
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Community Development Code ihereinafter "CDCi]
land allowed the] city to attach conditions to the
development in order to provide for projected
transportation and public facility needs.M6
The Dolans wanted to expand their business
and add larger parking facilities. Their plans con-
sisted of two phases. Phase one called for con-
structing a new 17,600 square foot building, demol-
ishing the old structure, and expanding the parking
lot.87 In phase two, construction of a second build-
ing and additional parking were planned.88 The
phase one expansion plans were seen as an intensi-
fication of use by the city, and, as such, they were
consistent with the general plan.89  I
Although the city granted the Dolans' building
permit, it imposed two conditions on the permit.0
First, the Dolans were to dedicate to the city all
property lying within the nearby floodplain. Second,
they were to dedicate to the city a fifteen-foot strip
of land adjacent to the pathway.91
The applicant shall dedicate to the City as
Greenway all portions of the site that fall
within the existing 100 year floodplain [of
Fanno Creek] (i.e. all portions of the prop-
erty below elevation 150.0) and all proper-
ty 15 feet above (to the east of) the 150.0
foot floodplain boundary. The building
shall be designed so as not to intrude into
the greenway area.
92
In requiring these conditions, the City of Tigard
Planning Commission (hereinafter "Planning
Commission") addressed the concerns expressed by
86. I. Tigard. pursuant to Oregon's land use program. OR. Rv.
STAT. §§ 197.005-.860 (1991). developed and Implemented the CDC.
a comprehensive plan. Dolan v. City of Tigard. 114 S. CL 2309
(1994). According to CDC, land owners within the Central Business
District must leave 15% oftheir land as open space. .
87. Dolan v. City of Tigard. 854 P.2d at 438.
88. 4.
89. d.
90. 1. at 439.
91. .
92. Id. at 438 n.3 (quoting from Tigard's permit dedslon). The
Oregon Supreme Court noted that the dedication comprised
approximately i0 percent of the Dolans' property. Dolan v. City of
Tigard. 854 P.2d at 438 n.3.
93. Id. at 438. In attempting to justify the dedication of the fif-
teen-foot pathway, the Planning Commission stated lilt is reason-
able to assume that customers and employees of the future uses of
this site could utilize a pedestrian/bicyde pathway adjacent to this
development for their transportation and recreational needs.' Id.
As for the floodplain dedication, the Planning Commission found.
"that the required dedication would be reasonably related to
the applicant's request to intensify the usage of this site.... The
increased impervious surface would be expected to Increase
the amount of storm water runoff from the site to Fanno Creek.
Id.
the Supreme Court in NolIlan and the requirements
of Oregon state law by finding that the dedications
were "reasonably related to the applicant's request
to intensify the development of [the] site."93 The
Dolans sought a variance from the conditions, but
the Planning Commission denied the request, in
part because granting the variance would have con-
flicted with the city's plan to provide a continuous
pathway system.94
B. Procedural History
The Dolans appealed the Planning
Commission's decision to the Tigard City Council
(hereinafter 'City Council"), which approved the
order." Next, the Dolans appealed to the state Land
Use Board of Appeals (hereinafter "LUBAX), 6 argu-
ing that the dedication requirements were not relat-
ed to the proposed development w The Dolans did
not challenge the connection between the legiti-
mate public purposes put forward by the Planning
Commission and the specific conditions imposed
on the permit.3 The LUBA accepted the findings of
the City Council%9 and asked only whether those
findings supported its actions1C0 The LUBA con-
cluded that, since the proposed development would
lead to higher runoff due to the increases in imper-
vious surfaces, the requisite "reasonable relation-
ship" was present to justify the floodplain dedica-
tion.101 Likewise, the LUBA held that the bicycle
path dedication was reasonably related to alleviat-
ing the impacts of the increase in traffic that would
result from the Dolans' new business being signifi-
cantly larger than their current one.102
94. I1 at 439. 445-46. The Dolans argued that the proposed
development would not conflict with the general plan. They did not
attempt to avoId the dedication by mitl.atinr in another manner.
which they could have done under the Tigard Community
Development Code. Dolan v. City of Tigard. i 14S. Ct. at 2314. The
constitutionality of the dctys variance provisions was not addressed
by the U.S. Supreme Court. I. at 2315 n.4.
95. Dolan v. City of Tigard. 854 P.2d at 440.
96. M Oregon's LUBA was established by the Oregon
Planning Act of 1973 as an Intermediate appellate body. OF. R .
STAT. § 197.015 (1994).
97. Dolan v, City of Tigard. 854 P.2d at 440.
93. d.
99. U Oregon. like California. requires that certain adminis-
trative decisions be supported by substantial eidenme. The preem-
Inent California case on findings in administrative and legislatk;e
land use decisions is Topanga Ass'n for a Scenic Community v.
County of Los Angeles. 522 P2d 12 (Cal. 1974),
100. Dolan v. City of Tigard. 22 Or LUBA 617. 626 n.9 (1992).
101. Dolan v. City of'rigard. 854 R2d at 440.
102. Dolan v. City of Tigard. 22 Or LUBA at627. In its decsion.
LUBA noted that the land the Dolans were asked to dedicate was a
link In the Comprehensive Pedestrian/B!cycle Pathway Plan adopt-
ed by the City of Tigard. U
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The Dolans appealed the LUBA's decision to
the Oregon Court of Appeals, which ruled against
the Dolans. The court interpreted Nollan as retaining
the reasonable relationship test, 10 3 holding that the
Supreme Court had not replaced the test with a
tougher "essential nexus" test.i14
The Dolans next took their appeal to the
Oregon Supreme Court.. The court addressed the
argument that a "reasonable relationship" standard
was Constitutionally deficient, such that there must
be an "essential nexus" or "substantial relationship"
between the impacts of the development and the
dedication requirements.105 The court held that the
reasonable relationship test was still the standard
and equated it with the "essential nexus" language
used by the U.S. Supreme Court:"'6 "Nollan, then,
tells us that an exaction is reasonably related to an
impact if the exaction serves the same purpose that
a denial of the permit would serve."107
The court found an essential nexus between the
pathway and the proposed development because of
the increase in traffic that would accompany the
Dolans' new building. 1°8 Likewise, since the devel-
opment would increase the site's impervious surface
area, the floodplain dedication was also upheld.'09
The court dismissed the Dolans' secondary
argument in a footnote:
petitioners also argue that, because city's
dedication conditions would require per-
manent physical occupation of a portion of
their property, they amount to a per se tak-
ing. That argument is not well taken. Such
dedication conditions are not per se tak-
ings, because the occupation may occur
only with the owner's permission.
Petitioners may avoid physical occupation
of their land by withdrawing their applica-
tion for a development permitY 0
In dissent, Justice Peterson argued that,
beyond showing that the exactions serve a legiti-
mate state purpose, the exacting body
103. Dolan v. City of Tigard. 854 P.2d at 440-41.
104. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 832 P.2d 853. 855 (Or. 1992).
105. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 854 P.2d at 441 (1992).
106. Id. at 442-43. in doing so, the Oregon Supreme Court
noted that the Ninth Circuit had reached a similar conclusion in
Commercial Builders v. Sacramento, 941 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991).
cert. denied, _ U.S. _. 112 S. Ct. 1997 (1992). Dolan v. City of Tigard,
854 P.2d at 443 n.9.
107. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 854 P.2d at 443.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 443-44.
1i. Id. at 441 n.8. Thus, the Court returned to the traditional
must show that the granting of the permit
probably will create specific problems, bur-
dens, or conditions that theretofore did
not exist, and that the exaction will serve to
alleviate the specific problems, burdens, or
conditions that probably will arise from the
granting of the permit. More than general
statements about increased traffic or pub-
lic safety are required to support, as per-
missible regulation, what otherwise would
be a taking.iI
Justice Peterson then examined the Planning
Commission's findings to see if it had met this bur-
den. He concluded that the Planning Commission's
Final Order did not adequately show that the new
development created the need for the pathway
exactions:1 2 "[tlhe findings of fact that the bicycle
pathway system 'could offset some of the traffic
demand' is a far cry from a finding that the bicycle
pathway system will, or is likely to, offset some of the
traffic demand."' 13 Justice Peterson himself summa-
rized his position best: "All that these findings
establish is that there will be some increase in the
amount of storm water runoff from the site. A thim-
bleful? The Constitution requires more than
that.""14
C. The Supreme Court's Decision
Arguing that the City of Tigard had not ade-
quately justified its exactions .the Dolans made
one final appeal, this time to the United States
Supreme Court.'1 ' In early 1994, the Court granted
certiorari,ii 6 and the case was argued on March 23,
1994. Chief Justice William Rehnquist delivered the
decision of the Court on June 24, 1994,117 with
Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas
joining in the majority's opinion.ii 8 The Court's
goal, in Rehnquist's words, was "Itlo resolve a
question left open by our decision in Nollan v.
California Coastal Commission of what is the required
degree of connection between the exactions
imposed by the city and the projected impacts of
concept of conditioned permits as a quid pro quo, reiterating that
land owners' rights of development are far from unlimited
111. Id. at 444-45,
112. Id. at 446.
113. Id, (emphasis in original).
114. Id.
115. Dolan v. City of Tigard. 114 S, Ct. at 2317.
116. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 854 P.2d 437, 438 (Or. 1993), cert.
granted. 114 S. Ct. 544 (1994).
117. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S, Ct. 2309 (1994).
118. Id.
Corey E Tirylor
SI!,:ng v. C0! r3 CCrifns  n?
the proposed development.""19
In its opinion, the Court first drew a parallel
between the Dolan and NolLan cases: "[wlithout
question, had the city simply required petitioner120
to dedicate a strip of land along Fanno Creek for
public use. rather than conditioning the grant of her
permit to redevelop her property on such a dedica-
tion, a taking would have occurred."' 21 A dedication
is a taking because it deprives Dolan of her right to
exclude others.1
22
The Court then distinguished Dolan in two
respects from several seminal land use cases. 23
First, the Court noted that Dolan's permit approval
was an adjudicative decision regarding an individ-
ual parcel of land, rather than a legislative decision
that affected a more generalized area. 124 Second,
Tigard asked Dolan to "deed portions of the proper-
ty to the city." rather than seeking to limit the use to
which she could put the parcel. 125 This request,
according to the Court, violated the doctrine of
"unconstitutional conditions" 126
The Court first decided that there was an essen-
tial nexus between the legitimate state interests
and the permit conditions, 27 thereby satisfying the
test enumerated in Nollan.
Not fully satisfied with the Nollan analysis, how-
ever, the Court then considered "'the required
degree of connection between the exactions and the
prolected impact of the proposed development."i 28
Rehnquist noted that three different standards have
been adopted by the states to address this issue of
causation: New York and Montana require -very
generalized statements" connecting the exaction
and impact;29 Illinois, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
and Ohio require that the impacts be "specifically
and uniquely attributable" to the proposed use for
the dedication to be valid;'" and, Nebraska, Texas,
and Wisconsin are among the states utilizing some
variation of the intermediate "reasonable relation-
ship" test.131
Eschewing all of these formulas, the Court cre-
ated and adopted a new "rough proportionality
test.'3 Meeting this "rough proportionality" test
requires that "the city must make some sort of indi-
vidualized determination that the required dedica-
tion is related both in nature and extent to the
impact of the proposed development." 33 In so
doing, however, "no precise mathematical calcula-
tion is required.... " 134 The Court viewed this new
heightened level of scrutiny as being necessary to
bring the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment
into conformity with the rest of the Bill of Rights:
"wle see no reason why the Takings Clause of the
Fifth Amendment, as much a part of the Bill of
Rights as the First Amendment or Fourth
Amendment, should be relegated to the status of a
poor relation in these comparable circum-
stances." 35 The Court further decided that, in adju-
dicative decisions such as the one at bar, the gov-
ernment and its agencies should bear the burden of
119. Id. at 2312 (citations omitted).
120. Before the case reached the U.S. Supreme Court.
Florence Dolan's husband passed away. From this point on. there-
fore. petitionerwill be referred to in the singular.
121. Id. at 2316.
122. Id. The right to exclude others has been one of the
most frequently invoked inherent rights in property ownership used
by the Court in recent years. See supra text accompanying notes
29-31.
123. Dolan v. City of Tigard. 114 S. CL at 2316. See generally
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.. 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Pennsylvania Coal
Co. v. Mahon. 260 U.S. 393 (1922); Agins v. City of Tiburon. 447 U.S.
255 (1980).
124. Dolan v. City of Tigard. 114 S. CL at 2316.
125. Id.
126. Id. According to this doctrine, the government cannot
require a person to give up constitutional rights in exchange for a
discretionary benefit. Id. Justice Stevens argued that this well-set-
tied doctrne" is far from 'well-settled. Id. at 2328 n.12 (Stevens, I..
dissenting).
127. "Undoubtedly. the prevention of flooding along Fanno
Creek and the reduction of traffic congestion in the Central
Business District qualify as the type of legitimate public purposes
we have upheld." Id. at 2317-18 (majority opinion) (citirg Agins v.
City of Tiburon. 447 U.S. at 260-62 ).
128. Dolan v. City of Tigard. 114 S. Ct at 2317. The Court
remarked that this was left open in N0lbm as a moot question. L.
129. Id. at 2318. The two cases cited by the Court are lenad.
Inc, v. Scarsdale. 218 NE2d 673 (NY 1966) and Billings Properties.
Inc. v, Yelloostone County. 394 P2d 182 (Mont. 3964). Dolan v. City
of'Tigard. 114 S Ct. at 2318-19.
130. Dolan v, City of Tigard. 1I1 S, CL at 2318. Sez, e4,. Pioneer
Trust and Say Bank v. Mount Prospect. 176 NoE2d 799 (11. 1961);
.E.D. Asso=.. Inc. v, Atkinson, 432 A.2d 12 (N H. 1931); and Dhran
Builders, Inc. v. Planning Ed. of Township of Wayne. 334 A.2d 30
(N. 1975)
131. Dolan v. City of Tigard. 114 S. Ct. at 2318. See. e.g..
Simpson v. North Platte. 292 NW2d 297 (Neb. 1930); College
Station v Turtle Rock Corp. 6,90 S W,2d 802 (Tex 1934J;.and lordan
v, Menomonee Falls, 137 NW 2d 442 (Wis. 1965). California. prior
to D:!2n. did not follow, any of these three analyses. Rather.
California courts vie ed development as a right. nota pnvilege. See.
e.g.. Homebuilders of Greater Eastbay, Inc- v. City of Walnut Creek.
484 P.2d 606 (CaL 1971),
132. Dolan v, City of Tigard, 114 S, Ct. at,2319. Chief Justice
Rehnquist notes that this test Is basically the "reasonable relation-
ship" test but the Court does not adopt that language'because the
term..,seems confusingly similar to the term 'rational basis' which
describes the minimal le l of scrutiny under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment" U. This cautious decision
was no doubt influenced by justice Brennan's remarks in Nozan that
the standard Invoked there vras essentially the same as that utilized
In certain equal protection and due process cases. Nollan v.
California Coastal Commission. 483 US- at 843 (Brennan. I.. dis-
senting), see supra note 72
133, Dolan v City ofTigard. 114 S Ct. at 2319-20.
134. 11 at 2320
135, L at 2320.
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justifying the dedication.1 36
The Court did not dispute the contention that
keeping the floodplain area free from development
would ease the impacts of Dolan's proposed use.
137
However, the Court saw no justification for requir-
ing the greenway to be public, rather than private,
and felt that the Planning Commission had made
no determinations to justify a public greenway.i
38
The City of Tigard argued that the creation of a
recreational easement was an incidental result of
the required dedication, but the Court found this
infringement on Dolan's right to exclude the public
to be impermissible.1 9 Justice Rehnquist noted
that, if the greenway had preexisted on Dolan's land
and the store expansion had interfered with that
greenway, then the City of Tigard could have
required her to provide alternative greenway
space.
140
The City of Tigard estimated that Dolan's pro-
posed development would result in 435 additional
automobile and bicycle trips per day.i41 After noting
that dedications to offset these types of impacts are
generally accepted, the Court declared that the
Planning Commission's findings provided inade-
quate support for imposing such dedications in the
instant case. 142 Recalling Justice Peterson's state-
ment in the dissent of the Oregon Supreme Court
decision, the Court held that a finding that the
expansion of Dolan's store "could offset some of the
traffic demand" was insufficient. 4
3
Justice Stevens authored a dissent, in which
Justices Blackmun and Ginsburg joined. After reiter-
ating that Tigard could have denied Dolan's permit
outright as long as the denial was not arbitrary,
44
Justice Stevens asserted that the majority had mis-
interpreted the cited cases 45 Drawing a parallel
between Dolan and the subdivider in Jordan v.
Menomonee Falls,146 Stevens noted that the Court
never mentioned the benefit that Dolan would gain
from the floodplain dedication: a decreased likeli-
hood that her own plot would flood.47 In addition,
Stevens noted that the cited state cases and numer-
ous Supreme Court cases, rejected the idea of con-
ceptual severance. 48 Stevens also felt that the peti-
tioner did not show what impact the dedications
would have "on the value or profitability of her
planned development. 149 Stevens proposed that
the essential nexus test is insufficient only when the
exaction is grossly disproportionate to the develop-
ment's impacts. 50 Finally, the dissent noted the dif-
ficulty in estimating the impacts of a particular
development project and the problems inherent in
having courts second guess local governments,'1
If the Court proposes to have the federal
judiciary micro-manage state decisions of
this kind, it is indeed extending its wel-
come mat to a significant new class of liti-
gants. Although there is no reason to
believe that state courts have failed to rise
to the task, property owners have surely
found a new friend today'
52
Justice Souter also dissented in a separate
opinion, arguing that "the Court Ididl not apply Iltsl
test to these facts, which do not raise the question
the Court addresses." 53 Souter also felt that the
majority put too much emphasis on the incidental
recreational use that would result from the dedicat-
ed land and that Tigard never attempted to justify
that use as related to flood control.15 4 Justice Souter
further argued that the Court misapplied Nollan and
that, if satisfaction of the "essential nexus" test
does not end the inquiry, then Dolan's dilemma was
not the proper vehicle to change the law.55
136. Id. at n.8. However. where a landowner seeks to challenge
legislative decisions, such as zoning regulations, the burden
remains on the challenging party. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 2320-22.
140. Id. at 2321.
141. Id.
142. "loin the record before us. the city has not met its bur-
den of demonstrating that the additional number of vehicle and
bicycle trips generated by petitioner's development reasonably
relate to the city's requirement for a dedication of the pedestn-
an/bicycle pathway easement.' Id.
143. Id. at 2321-22.
144. Id. at 2322 (Stevens, I.. dissenting).
145. Id.
146. Jordan v. Menomonee Falls, 137 N.W.2d at 448; see al
supra note 131.
147. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct, at 2324 (Stevens, J,, dis-
senting). This idea, known as 'average reciprocity of advantage,
was discussed by the Court in Pennsylvania Coal, Euclid, and many
other land use cases.
148. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 &, Ct, at 2324 (Stevens, I., dis-
senting). Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City. 438 U.S. 104
(1978); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n, v. DeBenedictis, 480 US,
470 (1987); Andrus v. Allard. 444 U S. 51 (1979)
149. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct, at 2325 (Stevens. I. dis-
senting).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 2325-26. 2328-29.
152. Id. at 2326.
153. Id. at 2330 (Souter, J., dissenting).
154. Id.
155. Id. at 2331. Justice Souter also mentioned In a footnote
that the permit conditions were not adjudicative In nature as the
majority proposed, the only adjudication was the Dolan's variance
request. Id. at 2331 n.l.
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D. Reactions to Dolan
Before the Court issued its final decision in
Dolan, land use attorneys were already noting its
potential impacts.156 In fact, one scholar went so far
as to "assist" the Court in deciding the controversy.17
In the first four months after the decision was
published, at least a dozen legal articles were writ-
ten on Dolan.1" 8 Many of these published commen-
tators had positive reactions.1 59 Texas Lawyer fea-
tured a reaction to Dolan in its column 'The
Layman's Eye."i60 The author, William Murchison,
unabashed in his support for the decision, called
Dolan "the most important judicial victory for eco-
nomic liberty since the 1930s; in fact, it's the first
since then to recognize that economic liberty might
be on the same level as other cherished free-
dohis."161 Murchison expressed the view that, in
recent years, governments went overboard regulat-
ing pnvate property nghts,162 a wrong that the Dolan
decision corrected.
It is clear that most land use lawyers, as well as
lay people educated in land use law, have strong
opinions on the Dolan decision. However, it is
unclear what impact the decision will have.
Although only time (and additional statutes and
case law) will tell, Paul D. Kamenar, the executive
legal director of the Washington Legal Foundation,
suggested that the impacts of Dolan will be far
reaching:i63
lilt Would be a mistake to read Dolan nar-
rowly... limiting its applicability only to
those development exactions requiring
dedications of property. The principle
enunciated applies equally to conservation
easements and mitigation requirements
typically required by federal and state gov-
ernments for wetland development and
other environmental programs.i1
If Professor Kamenar's view becomes a reality,
Dolan would impact nearly every state and local
government in the United States and will radically
change the way in which governments acquire land
for a public purpose. People on all sides of the issue
will need to rethink their land use strategies in the
wake of Dolan.
V. THE CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMMISSION
A. A Brief History
In 1976, the California State Legislature passed
the California Coastal Act of 1976.165 The Act creat-
ed the Commission, which took the place of the
California Coastal Zone Conservation Commission.
an entity that had been created through a voter ini-
tiative. 6
The jurisdiction of the Commission covers the
"coastal zone," which, generally speaking, runs
along the California coast from Oregon to
Mexico. 167 The zone extends seaward to the extent
of California's jurisdiction and inland usually 1,000
yards from the mean high tide line of the sea.6'
156. See. e.g.. Richard C. Reuben, Takings at Issue In Lard Appcahi
Property RighLs Advocates Buoyed by High Court's Dcdson to Grant Cert.
ABA JouRAL.. May 1994. at 20.
157. Douglas Kmiec. Clarifying the Supreme Court's Takirgs Cases
- An Irreverent but Otherwise Unassailable Draft Opinion In Dolan v. City
of Tigard. 71 DENy. U. L REv. 325 (1994). in the Artide. Professor
Kmiec, tongue in cheek. ndiculed the names of recent takings
cases, the Supreme Court's law clerks. and the Justices themselves.
At the same time. however, he correctly predicted that the Court
would place the burden of proof on the City of Tigard to demon-
strate that the exactions were not a taking. Professor Kmiec further
anticipated the proportionality issue that led the Court to remand
the case. although not the exact language of the new standard. Id.
at 334.
158. See. e.g.. John M. Armentano, High Court's "Don" Ruling:
~Government Has the Burden of Showing Rough PrportIonality. NEw Ycrx
LAw louRNAL. July 6. 1994, at 5; William Murchison. A RPfrsihng Take
on Property Rights. TEXAs LAWYER. July 11. 1994, at 23; Lewis Goldshore
& Marsha Wolf. Court Sets Two-Part Test for Land-Use Regulations, NEW
JEsy LAw JouRN.ti July 18. 1994. at 11; Harry L McNeal. U.S. Supreme
CL Sides with Land owners As Dolan Fills Gap W4 by Nolln Declsion.
PENNmLVANiA LAw WEEKLY. July 18. 1994. at 12. Stephen L Kass &
Michael B. Gerrard, Meeting the Rough "ProFortIonalityTes o"f Dolan, N w
YoRK LAw JoupRNi. July 22. 1994. at 3; Harry L McNeal. Nrw Test For
Validity of Property Regulation Hezghtens Importance of Takings Clause,.
PEN sYVANiA LAw WEEKLY, July 25. 1994, at 12; Jeffrey L Braun, Rough
Proportionality: Can It Play in New York?,NEw YoK LAw JoueA.1, July 27,
1994, at 1; Jennifer L Tiller. Dolan v. City of Tigard. Takings cuse No
Longer a Poor Relation, LEG& BAcxcrOUNDER. July 29. 1994. at 24; Tony
Mauro. The Yc2rcf %cm ens Rlpi;ts and- Prorty R.;,its. Ttr. Cc,.o*cmnc
LAwTRiEu., Aug I, 1994, at 19;TonyMauro.An Odl Du3 cfHal=&r.
Nnw IERte LA' lwuav., Aug. 22, 1994. at 1; George H. Kendall.
Prperty Ow ers Gel a Tcd,. New JL"rtzv LW lo ura., Aug. 22. 1994. at
35; Paul D. Kamenar, A Ou st [r an Inv.orated Tafing Clause. Ttm
Rac=OiR Aug. 26. 1994, at 7; M. Robert Goldstein & Michael 1.
Goldstein, Fr o Nollan to Dolan to.... NawYc-x LAwIowJ l'.. Aug. 24.
1994, at 3.
159. Se. e.g., Goldstein & Goldste in supra note 158. The authors
are self-professed condemnation practitioners, and. while the artide
sho-es their bias, it pro',ide a fine review of the decis on.
160. MurchLson. supra note 158.
161. It.
162. Id.
163. Kamenar. supra note 158. Mr. Kamenar filed an amicus
brief on behalf of Florence oan.
164.
165 , C0 Pua, Rrs. Cooz § 30090 (West 1994) (hereinafter
"ActJ}.
166. CoL Pua. REs. Co. § 27100 (repealed 19771 (West 1994).
The California case upholding the original Commission as consti-
tutional is CEEED v. California Coastal Zone Conservation
Commission, 43 Cal. App, 3d 306 (1974).
167. CAL Pua. REs. Ccoz § 30103(a) (West 1994).
168. 11. The CommLssion has maps filed with the county clerk
of each coastal county which exactly describe the coastal zone CAL
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In passing the Act and establishing the
Commission, the Legislature declared that: "the
California coastal zone is a distinct and valuable
natural resource;"' 69 protecting California's natural
resources is a "paramount concern; 170 using the
police power is necessary to protect the coastal
zone;17 1 and "existing developed uses, and future
developments that are carefully planned and devel-
oped consistent with the policies of this division,
are essential to the economic and social well-being
of the people of this state....172
The Legislature further enumerated five main
goals of the Act and the Commission. First, the Act
should "[pirotect, maintain, and, where feasible,
enhance and restore the overall quality of the
coastal zone environment and its natural and artifi-
cial resources."17 3 Second, it should balance conser-
vation and utilization of coastal zone resources.17 4
Third, it should "Imlaximize public access to and
along the coast and maximize public recreational
opportunities in the coastal zone consistent with
sound resources conservation principles and con-
stitutionally protected rights of private property
owners." 175 Fourth, it should give preferential treat-
ment to coastal-related developments on the
coast. 176 Finally, it should encourage state and local
involvement in coastal zone issues. 177 The Act is to
be liberally construed to achieve these ends. 178
The Commission achieves the above goals
through a variety of methods. It disseminates infor-
mation about the California coast to local govern-
ments and private citizens through the coastal
resource information center and the guide to
coastal resources.17 9 The Act -imposes a duty on
local governments to prepare local coastal pro-
grams containing, among other items, a public
access component;180 these local programs must be
approved by the Commission.'8' The Commission
also has authority to issue permits for certain activ-
ities that will take place within the coastal zone, 82
including permits for development within the
zone. 183 The Dolan decision most immediately
affected this last function.
The Legislature envisioned utilizing the pre-
existing permit framework of local governments to
further the land use goals of the Act,' 84 upon
approval of local coastal programs by the
Commission. 185 The Commission itself would only
issue permits when local governments had not yet
enacted approved programs and in three other enu-
merated situations. 186 Any person wishing to devel-
op within the coastal zone would need a permit
from the Commission, rather than a local govern-
ment entity, only when the proposed development
(1) was to occur "between the sea and the first pub-
lic road paralleling the sea or within 300 feet of the
inland extent of any beach or of the mean high tide
line of the sea where there is no beach, whichever is
the greater distance,"'8 7 (2) was to be located on
"tidelands, submerged lands, public trust lands,
within 100 feet of any wetland, estuary, stream, or
within 300 feet of the top of the seaward face of any
coastal bluff,"188 or (3) was a major public works pro-
ject or major energy facility. 89
Thus, while the Dolan decision may impact all
development within the coastal zone, the
Commission itself will only be affected in these
three situations or when a local government's
coastal program has not yet been approved by the
Commission.
B. The Permit Process
Since the Dolan decision dealt with exactions
resulting from development permit applications, it
PUB. RES. CODE § 30103(b) (West 1994). Generally, however, in sig-
nificant" areas, the zone extends to the lesser of the first maior
ridgeline paralleling the sea or five miles inland of the mean high
tide line; in designated urban areas, the zone extends less than 100
feet inland. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 30103(a) (West 1994). Revisions to
the Coastal zone boundary are described in CA.. PUB. RES. CODE §§
30150-176 (West 1994). The San Francisco area is under the luns-
diction of the San Francisco Bay Conservation and Development
Commission. CAL. Gov. CODE § 66600 (West 1994).
169. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 30001(a) (West 1994).
170. CAL PUB. REs. CODE § 30001(b) (West 1994).
171. CAL. PUB. Rzs. CODE § 30001(c) (West 1994).
172. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 30001(d) (West 1994).
173. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 30001.5(a) (West 1994).
174. CAL. PUB. RPS. CODE 4 30001.5(b) (West 1994).
175. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 30001.5(c) (West 1994).
176. CAL PUB. REs. CODE § 30001(d) (West 1994).
177. CAL.. PUB. REs. CODE 4 30001(e) (West 1994).
178. CAL PUB. RES. CODE § 30009 (West 1994).
179. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE §§ 30343-344 (West 1994).
180. CAL PUB. RFs. CODE § 30500(a) (West 1994).
181. CAL PUB. REs. CODE §§ 30510-526 (West 1994).
182. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 30600-627 (West 1994).
183. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 30600 (West 1994) ("In addition to
obtaining any other permit required by law from any local govern-
ment or from any state, regional, or local agency,..,any person
wishing to perform or undertake any development in the coastal
zone.. .shall obtain a coastal development permit.").
184. CAL. PUB. Rs., CODE § 30004 (West 1994) (local govern-
ments should be relied on heavily for coastal regulation).
185. See supra text accompanying notes 180-81.
186. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 30601 (West 1994),
187. CAL. PUB. RFs. CODE § 30601(i) (West 1994)
188. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 30601(2) (West 1994).
189. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 30601(3) (West 1994).
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-is necessary to examine the Commission's permit
process.
Chapter Three of the Act sets out the types of
developments within the coastal zone-that require
the approval of the Commission. 90 'Section 30210
opens with a paraphrase of Section 4 of Article X of
the California Constitution and states that "maxi-
mum access..and recreational opportunities shall
be provided for all the people consistent with pub-
lic safety needs and the need to protect public
rights, rights of private property owners, and natur-.
al resource areas from overuse." 19i
Section 30211 requires that "new development"
not interfere with the public's right of access to the
sea.9 2 To further this goal, the Act mandates access
from the "nearest public roadway to the shoreline,"
unless such access interferes with public safety,
military security, protection of coastal resources, or
agriculture or unless there is already adequate
access. 193
Certain developments are exempted from des-
ignation as "new developments" and therefore do
not require permits. Rebuilt seawalls that are not
relocated seaward of the previous seawall are
exempt. 9 4 Structures rebuilt after a natural disas-
ter, 195 demolished and rebuilt single-family resi-
dences, 96 and other improvements that do not
intensify the use of a structure, move it seaward, or
block or impede public access are also exempt, 97
provided that the new building does not exceed
"either the floor area, height or bulk of the former
structure by more than 10 percent. " 98 Section 30610
lists other building activities that do not require
permits unless the Commission "determines that
the activity will have an adverse impact on lateral
access along the beach."199
190. CAL PUB. REs. CODE §§ 30200-265.5 West 1994).
191. CAL PUB. REs. CODE § 30210 (West 1994).
192. CAL PUB. RES. CODE § 30211 (West 1994).
193. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 30212(a) (Vest 1994). The comer-
stone of the Act is to provide public access to the coastline. Chapter
6. Article 3. of the Act, the Coastal Public Access Program. explains
how the Coastal Commission works with local governments to
develop a plan to further this end. CAL PUB. REs. CODE §§ 30530-534
(West 1994).
194. CAL PUB. REs. CODE § 30212(b)(4) (West 1994).
195. CAL PUB. REs. CODE §§ 30212(b)(I). 30610(g) (West
1994).
196. CAL PUB. REs. CODE § 30212(b)(2) (West 1994).
197. CAL PuB. REs. CODE § 30212(b)(3) (West 1994).
198. CAL PUB. REs. CODE §§ 30212(b)[I1-4). 306101g) (West
1994).
199. CAL PUB. REs. CODE § 30212(b)(5) (West 1994). These
exemptions include, among other activities, certain improvements
to single family residences. improvements to other structures that
The Act controls new commercial, residential.
or industrial developments by requiring that they
be near pre-existing developments,' and, further
new developments are limited by a concerr for the
visual and scenic qualities of coastal areas.2 01 The
Act declares that new developments should main-
tain or enhance public access to the coast.202 There
are six listed possible means of achieving this goal,
including facilitating transit service, providing com-
mercial facilities that will minimize the use of
coastal access roads, providing non-automobile cir-
culation within the development, and other meth-
ods that, presumably, will require some form of
dedication or exaction.
2 03
The Act has special provisions for industrial
development that, generally speaking, attempt to
minimize the effects of such uses within the coastal
zone.0 4
Any developments not in conformity with the
provisions of sections 30200-30265.5 of the Act will
be denied a coastal development permit2 0 Permits
for developments between the sea or shoreline of a
body of water within the coastal zone and the near-
est public road must "include a specific finding that
the development is in conformity with the public
access and public recreation policies of Chapter
three (commencing with section 30200). '" Anyone
engaging in development within the coastal zone
without a permit is subject to civil penalties.2 07
C. Remedies for Denied Permits
The Act also provides enumerated remedies for
aggrieved parties.2 0 Denied permit applications are
subject to judicial review by filing for a writ of man-
date within 60 days of the final decision.209 Not only
can the individual appeal, but 'any person who, in
will not adversely Impact the environment or access or change a
structure's use, and repair and maintenance of certain structures or
areas. CAL. Pa RErs. Cz § 30610 (Wlest 1994).
200. CAL. Pu3 REs. C oz § 30250 (West 1994).
201. CAL Pua. REs. Ccoz § 30251 (West 1994).
202. CAL. Pua. REs. Co e § 30252 (West 1994).
203. CAL. Pua. REs. Ccom § 30252 (West 1994).
204. CA. Pua. REs. Coo § 30261-265,5 (West 1994).
205. CAL. Pua. REs. Coz § 30694(a) (west 1994).
206, CAL, Pua. Rrs. Coo= § 30624(c) (West 1994).
207. CAL .Pua RES- Cozz §§ 30320-826 (West 1994). A three
year statute of limitations governs these claims. CA.. Pua. REs. Coos
§ 30805.5 (West 1994),
208, CoL. Pia REs, Cc=s §J 30300-11 (West 1994). The enu-
merated remedies are in addition to, not in lieu of. remedies avail-
able at law.. PCua FiR C z § 30.00 (West 1994).
209. CA.. Puta. Rs, coo.- 4 3001 (West 1594). The writ should
be filed in accordance with CA. C-, PF.c. Coz § 1094.5 (West
1994).
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person or through a representative, appeared at a
public hearing of the Commission" may also
appeal. 210 Further, the Commission can intervene in
an action between an aggrieved person and a-local
government entity.2 1' Any person believing that the
Commission failed to properly discharge its duties
under the Act is entitled to bring an action against
the Commission to enforce those duties.
2 2  I
VI. ANALYSIS OF DOLAN'S IMPACT ON THE
COMMISSION
In Dolan, the Court noted that, since the City of
Tigard made "an adjudicative decision to condition
[Dolan'sl application for a building permit on an
individual parcel .... the burden properly restledi
with the city [to justify the conditions." 213 Thus,
when the Commission makes an adjudicative deci-
sion to condition a permit, it bears the burden of
meeting the tests laid out in the Agins, Nollan, and
Dolan decisions. A dedication, or exaction, must
substantially advance legitimate state interests by
having: (I) an "essential nexus" between a legiti-
mate state interest and the permit condition; and
(2) a "rough proportionality" between the impacts of
the proposed permit and the dedication sought. in
Nollan, the Supreme Court assumed that the
Commission's conditioned permits were based
upon a legitimate state interest,21 4 so only the rela-
tionship of the dedication to the proposed develop-
ment had to be determined. In short, the
Commission must be more precise than ever in
determining why a dedication is necessary.
The Commission's Administrative
Regulations 215 describe the requirements for a per-
mit application. 216 After review, the executive direc-
tor of the Commission makes a final recommenda-
tion through "specific written findings, including a
statement of facts and legal conclusions, as to
whether the proposed development conforms to
the requirements of the California Coastal Act of
19 76."2
17 The staff also issues a written recommen-
dation,2i 8 which is then voted upon by the
Commission.219 After Dolan, more than ever, these
findings must explicitly lay out specific impacts and
explain how the dedication will alleviate the
impacts caused by the development both in kind
and degree.220 While it is unknown what depth of
analysis will be sufficient, Dolan makes it clear that
a showing that the dedication could offset limita-
tions on access or views is insufficient. 221 Since the
Commission has been in existence for nearly twen-
ty years, and many, if not most, plots of coastal land
are developed to some degree, the Commission
should have adequate information in its archives on
existing access conditions to aid it in these causa-
tion determinations. However, should the
Commission feel that it is unable to meet the addi-
tional burden established in Dolan, it can still deny
coastal zone development permits altogether,
222
There has been no clear statement by the
California courts as to what is required by the
"rough proportionality" test of Dolan. In fact, of the
two relevant appellate cases that have arisen since
Dolan, one does not mention Dolan223 and the other
has not been published.2 24 Both cases involved fees
demanded by a city as a condition of permit
approval. Ehrlich concerned a mitigation fee and an
in lieu art fee, while Jones dealt with the propriety of
impact fees. In both cases, the courts upheld the
fees. In Jones, the fees were upheld because the
study's findings met the "rough proportionality" test
of Dolan. 225 It is possible that these two cases are
distinguishable from the Dolan case and the
Commission's situation because they involved fees,
rather than actual dedications of land. Given the
emphasis of the Court in Dolan on the public's phys-
ical invasion of the petitioner's land, this interpre-
tation seems reasonable. One thing is certain, how-
210. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 30801 (West 1994).
211. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 30802 (West 1994).
212. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 30804 (West 1994).
213. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. at 2319-20 n.8.
214. See supra text accompanying note 74.
215. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. Xiv, § 13001-666.4 (West 1994).
216. CAL. CODE REGs. tit. xiV, § 13053.5 (West 1994). These
include plans, maps, photographs, environmental impact reports.
etc., 'sufficient to determine whether the project complies with all
relevant policies of the Califomia Coastal Act of 1976." CAL. CODE
REG. tit XIV, § 13053.5 (West 1994).
217. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. XIV, § 13075 (i994).
218. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. XIV, § 13075 (1994).
219. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. XiV. § 13081 (1994).
220. See, e.g., Dolan v City of Tigard, 114 . Ct at 2320-2 i.
221. Id.
222. See Nollan v. california Coastal Commission, 483 U S at
835-836.
223. Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 15 Cal, App 4th 1737 (1993),
review denied, No. S033642. 1993 Cal. LEXIS 4467 (Aug. 25. 1993),
review granted. No. S033642, 1995 Cal. LEXIS 1959 (March 16, 1995).
224. Jones v. County of Tuolumne, No. F018725. slip op. (Cal
Court of Appeal, Fifth District), review denied, No S043834, 1995 Cal.
LEXIS 417, at *I (Jan. 25. 1995)}
225. Daniel J. Curtain, Jr., The Status of 'Takings" After Dolan;
Recent Califoria Decisions that Uphold Impact Fees, CALIFORNA LAJD USE
LAw AND Poucy REPORTER, Jan. 1995, at 5.
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ever, these decisions further the trend of the
California courts to support land use regulations
and accomodate the Commission.226
It is possible that Dolan will-have a different
impact on the Commission depending on which of
the Commission's enumerated goals 227 the
Commission is attempting to achieve with a partic-
ular dedication. For example, the Court in Nollan
stated that since the Commission could deny a per-
mit to the Nollans under the state's police power, it
could condition their permit, as long as the condi-
tion furthered the same end as the denial.228 Thus,
requiring a public viewing spot on the Nollan's
property to protect the public's right to view the
coast would be Constitutional, despite the fact [hat such
an easement would constitute a pennanent physical occupa-
tion of the Nollan's land.229 Unless Dolan is interpreted
to make a physical occupation the deciding factor in
determining whether a land use regulation is a tak-
ing, and nothing in the decision suggests that this
is so, this option should remain a viable one, pro-
vided that the viewing spot, or height or width limi-
tation,230 meets the rough proportionality test of
Dolan, and the owner is not denid economically
viable use of his land.
231
If the Commission is trying to further its goal of
providing public access to the coast, justifying the
exaction may be more difficult. In Dolan, the Court
agreed that preventing building in the floodplain
would aid in minimizing the impacts from runoff.
23 '
However, the Court found no reasons for making
the floodplain greenway area public rather than pri-
vate because this distinction did not affect the
area's runoff.
2 33
Dedications ensuring access to the coastline
are different, because they directly conflict with the
goal of the Commission and can only be remedied
through a physical occupation. If a person wishes to
build on a parcel and thereby block public access to
the beach, then the only way to uphold the stated
goals of the Commission is to require a that a por-
tion of the land be dedicated for public access. Had
the Nollans been asked to leave the strip of proper-
ty running parallel to the beach as open space,
albeit privately owned by them, it would in no way
further the Commission's goal of protecting public
access to the coast. Again, if the dedication con-
flicts with the Agins test, a taking occurs and just
compensation is due. In any case, the Commission
will need to be careful in justifying its exactions
through its findings.
In Dolan, the Court noted that. "[ilf lDolan'sl
proposed development had somehow encroached
on existing greenway space in the city, it would have
been reasonable to require petitioner to provide
some alternative greenway space for the public.
either on her property or elsewhere.2 3 4 Here the
Commission's situation differs from the City of
Tigard's. It is conceivable that the prior determina-
tions of the Commission that have laid out access
paths to the coast, possibly through the develop-
ment of an access plan, pursuant to Chapter 6.
Article 3 of the Act, qualify certain areas as "exist-
ing" access paths, and require developers who
encroach on this access to mitigate 5
One result is nearly certain to arise in the wake
of the Dolan decision: an increase in litigation over
development permits. Since Dolan unequivocally
stated that an administrative regulating body has
the burden of justifying its exactions.236 developers
will be more likely to challenge the sufficiency of the
Commission's findings by appealing denied per-
mits. Well-supported findings that meet the addi-
tional hurdle of the Dolan decision should mitigate
the costs of this litigation, but, due to the height-
ened level of scrutiny, the findings themselves may
now cost the Commission more money, effort, and
time to generate. While it is certain that there will
be some increase in costs as a result of higher vol-
ume of litigation, the magnitude of such costs, and
their effects on California taxpayers, if any, remains
to be seen.
VII. CONCLUSION
In the wake of Dolan, the analysis courts will use
to determine when land exactions become takings
can be briefly summarized. When a land owner
applies for a building permit, the appropriate
226. See. eg.. Reed v. California Coastal Zone Conservation
Commission, 55 Cal. App. 3d 889 (1975); Grupe v. California Coastal
Commission, 166 Cal. App. 3d 148 (1986); Whalers' village Club v.
California Coastal Commission, 173 Cal. App. 3d 240 (1985);
Delucchi v. City of Santa Cruz. 179 Cal. App. 3d 814 (1986).
227. See supra text accompanying notes 173-77.
228. Nollan v. California Coastal Commission. 483 U.S. at 836.
229. U.
230. Preserving the visual qualities of coastal lands Is a
requirement for acquirng a coastal development permit. C.. PuB.
Res. Coos § 30251 (West 1974)-
231, Sa supra text accompanying note 55, The likelihood of the
California courts interpreting a land use regulation as denring all
viable use of land is unlikely, Stm su;pa text accompanying note 57.
232. Dolanv. City ofrigard, 114 S Ct. at 2320.
233, l
234. L. at 2321
235. CAL. Pua RPEs Co §§ 3053D-534 (West 1994).
236 -S supra text accompanying note 136,
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agency or governmental body may deny the permit,
grant the permit, or grant the permit subject to con-
ditions. An agency or government body may deny a
permit if doing so is within the government's police
power and does not remove all of the land's value.
Following Agins, a government entity may con-
dition the permit only if the conditioned permit
substantially advances legitimate state interests
and if it does not deny an owner economically
viable use of his or her land, which seems unlikely
to occur in California.
237
To satisfy the first prong of the Agins test (i.e.,
that the permit substantially advances legitimate
state interests), the government entity seeking the
exaction must demonstrate two things. First, there
must be an "essential nexus" between a legitimate
state interest and the permit condition; the condi-
tion cannot utterly fail to further the end advanced
as the justification for the prohibition.2 38 Second,
the entity must show a "rough proportionality"
between the impacts of the proposed land use and
the dedication sought.239 While no precise mathe-
matical calculation is required in making this sec-
ond determination, it is necessary to determine that
the required dedication is related both in nature
and extent to the anticipated impact.240
The Commission remains one of the state's
more important protectors of natural resources, as
well as one of the nation's most ambitious and suc-
cessful programs. Despite the uproar that Dolan
caused, the case's impacts on the Commission do
not appear to be substantial.
First, there are only a limited number of situa-
tions where a land developer needs to obtain a per-
mit from the Commission itself. Second, if the
Commission does become involved, solid adminis-
trative findings supported by the particular facts of
the application should be sufficient to justify many
exactions, despite there having been no indication
of exactly what level of scrutiny Dolan mandates. The
Commission must now be concerned not only with
the nature of the proposed development's impact
on the goals of the Act, but the extent to which the
development frustrates or limits those goals. Third,
Nollan supports the idea that the Commission can
limit development dimensions, or even require a
view site on a development to protect the public's
right to view the coast. Fourth, while providing for
public access inherently involves a dedication of
land, situations where access plans pre-exist any
new developments are arguably distinguishable
from the Dolan. However, since the Commission has
the burden of justifying any exactions it demands as
237. Agins v. city of Tiburon. 447 U.S. at 260.
238. See supra text accompanying note 77.
a condition of permit approval, litigation is certain
to increase somewhat. However, it appears that
Dolan and the Commission are unlikely to meet each
other very often in California courts.
239. Dolan v. City of Tigard. 114 S. Ct. at 2319.
240. Id. at 2319-20.
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